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ABSTRACT 
 States are path dependent entities that deviate solely in the face of catastrophic 
failures in the pursuit of axiomatic ends by conventional  means. The inertia of 
bureaucratic institutions, a foreign policy consensus within a self-reproducing elite of 
experts, the self-interest of political elites and a sense of “national self” or identity lead 
states to understand themselves in light of a history and a relative level of status on the 
world stage. Since the end World War II, the U.S. has a certain path that places the 
spread of democracy and laissez-faire capitalism extremely important if not vital foreign 
policy goals. In the case of the transition from the Soviet Union to Russia through the 
1990s,  movement toward laissez-faire capitalism and democratization were conflated 
and the U.S.’s democratization programs in Russia from 1989 to 2004 were 
predominantly focused on the expansion of neo-liberal capitalism to the former socialist 
republics. These programs were shaped by and in line with a rendition of modernization 
theory proposed by Francis Fukuyama and scholars sharing his ideologically shaped 
views. This theory assumed that positive outcomes like democracy and market reform 
were related, interconnected, and self-reinforcing. This is incompatible with the theory of 





Seymour Lipset. Moving forward this ideological position must be abandoned to 
implement efficacious democratization programs. However, given the role capitalist 
values, corporate interests trade play in the U.S.’s political path I struggle to see that 
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CHAPTER ONE: PATH DEPENDANCY 
By virtue of existing in a politically, and economically, interconnected world, 
modern states inevitably evolve an elite of foreign policy officials, intellectuals, and low-
level officers with ideological commitments to a state's “path” across what Bismarck 
calls “the stream of time.” 1 This path is self-reinforcing as alliance patterns are formed, 
other states determine the incompatibility of their foreign policy goals with other state’s, 
and every year new classes of bureaucrats and diplomats learn “the way things are done.” 
This path dependency is stronger than the wills, and whims, of elected officials and the 
political appointees they put atop these agencies. Although there is some evidence to 
suggest destroying the agency entirely is possible, they can do little to change the 
fundamental goals, and traditional methods of achieving those goals, that agencies 
engage in. Assuming they didn’t share those same fundamental goals to begin with. 2 
Over the course of this paper I will outline the paths I perceive as central to Russian and 
American political development. This will necessarily include philosophical and 
ideological conceptions of “identity” and the international order. Secondly, I will 
consider the question of states engaging in foreign “democratization missions” and then 
 
1 von Bismarack Otto. Gedanken und erinnerungen. BoD–Books on Demand, 2012. 
2 Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace. New 




directly respond to the theoretical models of democratization put forth by Francis 
Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington.  
I will, also, build my own action model based on the theories of Juan Linz, Larry 
Diamond, Seymour Lipset, and Norman Eisen. Thirdly, I will describe the policies and 
actions the U.S. undertook from 1989 to 2004 in Russia and Eastern Europe. I believe 
that traditional democracy supporting apparatuses, funded programs, public speeches, and 
seemingly unrelated actions had a direct effect on the viability of the U.S. 
democratization mission in Russia. Finally, in comparing the theoretical model of 
democratization and the policy record of the U.S. I will offer my critique and an insight 
into the true intentions of U.S. democratization efforts in this instance.  
What a state has done in the past is a heavy weight on its future actions; 
potentially even more so internationally than domestically. A state’s previous actions, 
history of engagement, and conception of the intention of other actors will compel that 
state to enact a foreign policy that is, very often, consistent with its historical record. As 
early realist scholar Hans Morgenthau wrote in Politics Among Nations, “a state’s foreign 
policy is largely consistent within itself.” 3  In fact, Morgenthau argues that his ambition 
in realism is to create a model of international relations that does not assume the directive 
preeminence of the wishes and whims of particular leaders; whether that is because they 
are ineffective at orchestrating change, governing, or simply enunciating what policy 
changes they envision. In effect, Morgenthau was arguing against the liberal tendency he 
 
3 Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace. New 




saw at the time to hypothesize that states, undergoing leadership transitions, could also 
undergo massive policy transitions as well.  
He disagrees, and I take as a base assumption, that regardless of transitions of 
power between political leaders and political parties a state’s foreign policy, dependent 
on the inertia of entrenched interests, is largely consistent. The failure to enunciate policy 
wishes was not an issue for current Russian President Vladimir Putin who formed his 
policy prescriptions in the late 1990s.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its transition into 15 independent 
nation-states of various sizes, ethnic make-ups, and political wills the modern Russian 
Federation was born in turmoil. Current President Vladimir Putin described the fall of the 
Soviet Union, and the subsequent transition, as “the major geopolitical disaster of the 
century”. 4 Changes to political power centers, economic projections, physical borders 
and demography, and the calculation of “Russian” national interest happened over the 
course of years and against a backdrop of societal chaos.  
In the U.S., the collapse of the Soviet Union was received with shock by 
sovietologists, and for some, a world of possibility opened before them. This would be a 
time in which America could at least share, by gloved hand or iron fist, the gifts that G-d 
had bestowed on this new land, according to the American Protestant tradition of John 
 
4 “Did Vladimir Putin Call the Breakup of the USSR 'the Greatest Geopolitical Tragedy 







Winthrop. Preceding William Krystal and Robert Kagan’s “Project for the New 
American Century”, that made early calls for a “neo-Reaganite” foreign policy and the 
forced spread of democracy to Iraq, America’s intention to spread freedom and 
democracy had already begun in the former Soviet bloc. 5 6 There have been mass 
amounts of scholarship on the Iraq War project and the intentions of spreading 
democracy to the Middle East that the Bush Administration professed, partially goaded 
on by intellectuals like Kagan and Irving, in the modern era. However, the U.S.’ 
commitment to the spread of democracy has far deeper roots. American democracy 
building has had dual philosophical underpinnings in American exceptionalism and the 
ethical implications of liberal hegemony. This phenomenon has, at times, been lauded by 
the left and right wings of congress for ostensibly different reasons. As such, we’ll 
explore these philosophical routes beginning with the theology of American 
exceptionalism provided by John Winthrop aboard the Arbella in 1630. 7 Next, we’ll 
consider liberal hegemony and a philosophy of inalienable human rights in President 
Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points address and its mirror in CIA Director Robert Gate’s 
invocation of the Monroe Doctrine and security theory of democratization. 
 
5 Welcome to the Project for the New American Century. Accessed April 21, 2020. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130112203305/http://www.newamericancentury.org/. 
6 Ibid 
7 Furey, Constance M. “Theologies of American Exceptionalism: Winthrop and Cavell.” 






Finally, President George W. Bush’s own Bush Doctrine and support for democracy 
building will close our historical review of the philosophical underpinnings and, more-or-
less contemporary, manifestations of American democracy building.  
In her analysis of  U.S.-led legal reformation movements, Cynthia Alkon 
describes a “cookie-cutter syndrome” at work in the reformation of post-communist legal 
systems. Roughly stated, consultants and academics assume a perfect model of their own 
legal system and recommend simply establishing it in these post-communist countries. 8 
We will briefly address Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington whose conceptions of 
democratization, I believe, fall into this cookie cutter trap. Finally, as a key project of this 
paper, relying heavily on Larry Diamond’s The Spirit of Democracy I’ll build our 
theoretical model with which to compare the historical record. This model will 
necessarily include Diamond’s consideration of enforced democracies, the role of 
economics in democratization, and the value of a “history of democracy” in the state 
undergoing a democratizing project. 9   
In Critique of the Goethe Program Marx, addressed the imagined phenomenon of  
a new socialist system “just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every 
 
8 Alkon, Cynthia. "The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under Post-
Communist Democratization Programs." J. Disp. Resol. (2002): 327. 
9 Diamond, Larry. The Spirit of Democracy the Struggle to Build Free Societies 





respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the 
old society from whose womb it emerges.” 10 
In other words, the new society is necessarily impacted by and, in part, made up 
of the previous historical movement. In discussing the transition from the Soviet System 
to the anarchy of the mid-1990s in Russia and then to the modern Russian Federation, 
we’ll consider “birthmarks of the old society”. In the case of the development of Russia 
as a modern state these birthmarks are a retarded history of democratization efforts, 
historical events cemented in the Russian political consciousness, and pre-modern 
political organizations that reflect the geographic necessity of development on the Asian 
Steppe.  
Finally, we’ll address the empirical question: What were U.S. efforts in Russia 
from 1989 to 2004, successful or unsuccessful. It is ultimately my goal to outline the 
governing premises of U.S. democratization efforts in Russia from 1989 to 2004 by first 
describing those efforts in their historical context. Then we’ll  compare them to 
theoretical models of democratization and develop a theoretical framework for 
appreciating why the U.S. acted in the way it did. As well as the implicit  goals of  the 













CHAPTER TWO: THE PHILOSPHICAL ROOTS  OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY BUILDING EFFORTS 
In 1630 aboard the Arbella, Minister John Winthrop delivered A Modell of 
Christian Charity. A sermon to his band of pilgrims about their future settlement in the 
new world. This sermon, I would argue, is the foundational text of a uniquely American 
religion. Winthrop does two things in his address to the prospective settlers. First, he 
describes the position of this new land and of the settlers and himself. They are, to 
Winthrop, in a position of divinely granted superiority and hold an immense 
responsibility. For Winthrop, there are two groups, divinely ordained, as the rich in spirit, 
wealth, and potential, and the poor. 11 That gap cannot be eliminated but it must not grow 
so wide that it irrevocably divides society into warring groups dividing the wholeness of 
the body of Christ enmeshed in every person. The duty for the rich and their posterity is 
to give and govern justly; “in exercising his graces in them, as in the great [sic] ones, 
their love, mercy, gentleness, and temperance” says Winthrop. 12 He also famously closes 
his sermon, clearly setting himself and his followers among those who can only be 
described as rich saying, 
 
11 Winthrop, John. "A modell of Christian charity (1630)." Collections of the 





“For wee must consider that wee shall be as a citty upon a hill. The eies of all 
people are uppon us. Soe that if wee shall deale falsely with our God in this worke 
wee haue undertaken, and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help from us, 
wee shall be made a story and a by-word through the world.” 13 
 
For Winthrop, and Americans who shared in this theology and labored under the same 
Calvinist G-d, the U.S. and its people are special among nations and must bear the 
responsibility that entails or face divine wrath. This thesis provided a theological 
foundation for American expansion and when, after great effort and bloodshed, the  
country reached from shore to shore the national identity acquired a second pillar, the 
civic religion of inalienable rights and liberal hegemony. Or perhaps one could say that 
for non-believers Winthrop’s theology of exceptionalism assumed the shape of a civic 
religion.  At the same time Exceptionalism transformed from what  H.W. Brand calls 
“exemplarism,” whereby the U.S. is distinct from Old World Politics and is a model for 
their rebirth, to “vindicationalism” which shares Winthrop’s city on a hill identity but 
must act to spread its universal political values. 
This universal “vindicationalism”, I must be clear, was not always present. John 
Quincy Adams once said, ““America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. 
She is the well-wisher to freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and 
vindicator only of her own.” and although it is stretch to say America had any more than 
an isolationist streak this was a potential branching point from a  
 
13 Winthrop, John. "A modell of Christian charity (1630)." Collections of the 




Jacksonian foreign policy. 14A Jacksonian foreign policy being a term coined by Walter 
Russel Mead in his 2002 book, as a foreign policy characterized by, “ inward looking, 
shunned international engagement, but prepared to aggressively defend US national 
security if the country was threatened.” 15 This is the transition from Winthrop’s 
conception of America to President Bush and the modern American crusade for human 
rights. 16   
 In 2018, in The Great Delusion John Mearsheimer offers a critique of Liberalism 
as a theory of international relations and tool for developing foreign policy.  17 The heart 
of his critique is that liberal regimes, especially liberal hegemons where intent is paired 
with capability, have a core attachment to, and belief in, inalienable human rights. 
Predominantly in the twentieth century, other states have violated what U.S. liberal 
democratic regime considers fundamental inalienable human rights. At which point our 
regime has a moral duty to intervene through any means necessary to cease the violation 
of fundamental human rights, although it should be clear and Mearsheimer does not make 
it so, that U.S. government interventions, especially those predicated on force are 
 
14 “America's Last Crusade.” RealClearPolitics. Accessed April 21, 2020. 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/09/25/americas_last_crusade_115563.ht
ml. 
15 Mead, Walter Russell. SPECIAL PROVIDENCE: American Foreign Policy and How It 
Changed the World. S.l.: ROUTLEDGE, 2018. 
16 Monten, Jonathan. "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and 
Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy." International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 112-56. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137499. 
 17 Mearsheimer, John J. GREAT DELUSION: Liberal Dreams and International 




extremely divisive amongst self-described liberals. In addition, liberal theorists have 
argued that liberal democracies are less likely to, indeed virtually never, fight with each 
other and respect the human rights of their citizens. One such example was Maoz and 
Russet in their 1993 paper Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace 1946 – 
1986, predicated on theoretical works like Thomas Paine’s Common Sense and Immanuel 
Kant’s Perpetual Peace. 18 This, for Mearsheimer, leads to a pattern of behavior present 
in U.S. foreign policy whereby we merged a concern for human rights and security 
concerns to justify a policy of intervention. This belief in inalienable human rights has 
been critiqued by other realist scholars namely George Kennan. 
 In 1985, George Kennan readdressed his original critique of the moralistic 
tendencies present in U.S. foreign policy especially during the period of the cold war he 
studied. 19 In Morality and Foreign Policy, Kennan argued,  
“Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests 
of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual 
elements of that society may experience.” 20 
 
The government can’t be driven by the morality of the individual agents who make up the 
bureaucratic, executive, or legislative arms of the government but, as no internationally 
recognized system of morality exists, nor can it rely on any other universal system. The 
 
18 Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. "Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 
1946–1986." American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 624-638. 
19 Kennan, George Frost. American Diplomacy: 1900-1950.University of Chicago press: 
New Amer Library, 1985. 





moral tendency that Mearsheimer identifies as driving Liberal interventionalist policy is 
condemned by Kennan as the illegitimate addition of a moral position to a fundamentally 
amoral process: foreign policy. Regardless of Kennan’s condemnation of it or the outputs 
of this pervasive moral tendency identified by Mearsheimer, the tendency exists and 
when merged with conceptions of “national interest” it is a strong incentive for a U.S. 
foreign policy project concerned with spreading freedom and democracy to all of the 
states controlled by the “bad guys” of the world. 
 These two rationales, and a moral drive to set the world right, for the duty of the 
U.S. has guided our democratization efforts as long as we have had them. Strongly 
present in the  William Krystal, the Neo-conservative movement, and The Moral 
Majority, is a conception of America unique in privilege, and responsibility, to spread 
freedom and democracy where possible. 21 This responsibility is, in part, to secure the 
safety of the U.S.; but, also because democracy is a good in and of itself. Although, 
according to scholar Wendy Brown in her 2006 article, Krystal’s democracy mission is 
out of a contempt for a truly democratic society in favor of one in which state power is 
used punitively for moral agendas. 22 Additionally, because, as is stressed by right-wing 
interpreters of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, 
 
21 Welcome to the Project for the New American Century. Accessed April 21, 2020. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130112203305/http://www.newamericancentury.org/. 
22 Brown, Wendy. "American nightmare: Neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and de-




 “the strong do what they can, and the weak endure what they must.'' 23  The second 
conception, of an America that spreads democracy for the safety and preservation of the 
rights of others has held more sway with the ideological camp of the American “Left”. A 
seminal statement is embedded in the liberal, but racist, President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 
points justifying US entry into World War I.  
 In an address to the U.S. Congress at the close of World War I, President 
Woodrow Wilson lauded his 14 points outlining the ultimate aims of the war efforts. The 
majority of Wilson’s points from the adjudication of colonial claims, rejection of the 
“right of conquest”, and the freedom of trade, navigation, and sovereignty granted to 
post-colonial nations as well as the nations of Russia, Poland, Belgium, and France, 
whose territorial claims had shifted with the outcomes of the war, are indicative of the 
duties of democratization and liberalization described by Mearsheimer. For Wilson there 
can be no question that peace is achievable but not when illiberal regimes refuse to make 
amicable agreements with their citizens and the rest of the world. The Bretton Woods 
system, the United Nations, and the Universal System of Freedom of Navigation on the 
seas guaranteed by the U.S. is an attempt to arbitrate the world’s problems to avoid 
seeing those problems wash up on their shores the way the British, Spanish, and Japanese 
did before. The conception of  liberal democratization efforts, born not out of a belief in 
human rights but in an attempt to make the world safer for American capitalism has been 
a persistent theme of US policy for over a century 
 
23 Thucydides, and Charles Forster Smith. History of the Peloponnesian War. Cambridge, 




President Reagan’s CIA Director Robert Gates was called to testify as a part of 
the Iran-Contra investigation in congress where he said to end U.S. intervention in 
Nicaragua would be “totally to abandon the Monroe Doctrine”. 24 The U.S. not only 
could intervene in the western hemisphere but should to spread freedom and democracy 
as a safety measure. President George w. Bush took this notion just a step further in what 
has been called “national security liberalism” by Tony Smith in his 2000 article. 25 Yes, 
America should spread freedom and democracy in vital areas to ensure national security 
but with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term “vital areas” became a lot more 
pliable.  
At the 20th Anniversary party for the National Endowment for Democracy 
President G.W. Bush made a statement that laid bare the logic of national security 
liberalism. First saying, “As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the 
advance of freedom leads to peace” President Bush drew a direct cause and effect 
between the spread of democracy, at any cost, to the security and stability of the U.S. 26  
 
24 Smith, Gaddis. The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993. New York, NY: 
Hill and Wang, 1994. 
25 Smith, Tony. “National Security Liberalism and American Foreign Policy.” Oxford 
Scholarship Online. Oxford University Press. Accessed April 21, 2020. 
https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199240973.001.0001/acprof-
9780199240975-chapter-4. 
26 “Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for 




According to the 2002 National Security Strategy, the early 2000s were “ a moment of 
opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe” thanks to the position of 
unrivaled primacy afforded to the U.S. 27  
I must stress that an analysis of the history of American philosophical conceptions 
of democracy and democratization, while useful for our purposes, is a predisposition. 
There, is and was, a tendency among foreign policy scholars to assume the confluence of 
cultural and international relations systems, like Lapid and Kratochwil do in their 1996 
article. 28 Russian political system was synonymous with Russian cultural figures like 
Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, writing tangentially to political subjects like notions of freedom 
and duty to the state. 29 This proved inefficient at predicting policy decisions. I want to 
say that while this philosophical history lends a predisposition to American foreign policy 




27 United States. 2002. The national security strategy of the United States of America. 
[Washington]: President of the U.S. 
28 Rengger, N. J. “The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory Yosef Lapid and 
Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Eds. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996, Pp. Viii, 255: Canadian 
Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne De Science Politique.” Cambridge Core. 





29 Feng, Huiyun. "Cultural Influences on Foreign Policy." In Oxford Research 








CHAPTER THREE: A HISTORY OF RUSSIA’S DISPOSITION TOWARDS 
DEMOCRACY 
This predisposition is manifest in the history, bureaucratic structures, and alliance 
patterns that make up the U.S.’ path as I described earlier. Having discussed the history-
created predisposition affecting a U.S. conception of democracy and democratization, 
however, we should describe the formation of an alternative path in Russian political, and 
social history.  
The historical trajectory of Russian political development is marked by transitions 
towards democracy followed by harsh contractions when those democratic movements 
threaten some elite group. This expansion and contraction is mirrored in England and 
France’s own histories but the key difference is that Russia’s democratic expansion failed 
to secure democratic rights until much later and their political system was primarily 
tempered by the Mongol invasion and rule rather than the enlightenment and 
development of a liberal conception of human rights and the duties of a state. This 
historical trajectory is described best in terms of art, culture, philosophy, and political 







For 200 years, proto-Russian communities and villages paid tribute to the Mongol 
Empire with taxes collected by the Russian princes who were allowed political rule so 
long as tribute was kept. 30 This period of Mongol rule served to sever Russia from the 
historical development of Western Europe while leading to the implementation of several 
new systems of government including a postal system, census, tax collection system, and 
the expansion of capital punishment, once only applicable to serfs became universal as a 
punishment and torture was integrated into the judicial system. 31 Historians, like 
Billington, have argued the degree to which this period influenced Russian political 
development, but this period does serve, uncontrovertibly, as the foundation for a 
conception of a sovereign whose duty is solely to provide security without an expansive 
conception of the rights of citizens 
Contrary to this conception of absolute power ensconced in the sovereign; the 
“obshchina,” a system of communal ownership that preceded serfdom, and followed it 
until the collectivization of agriculture under the Stalin administration, existed in rural 
communities across Eurasia and Eastern Europe. As described by Alexander Chuprov, 
free peasants – in later centuries following the imposition of serfdom – serfs too (often 
the descendants of free peasants) formed villages where land was allocated to males 
forming new family units who didn’t inherit land as the eldest son. This allocation was 
 
30 Billington, James H. The Icon and the Axe: an Interpretative History of Russian 
Culture. New York: Vintage Books, 1970. 
31 Vernadsky, George. (1970). The Mongols and Russia. A History of Russia, Vol. III. 




carried out by a primitive government made up of the eldest member of each family unit 
which would mark and distribute new land to new families on the basis that they would 
provide for the common welfare of the “obshchina.” Jovan E. Howe explains,  
"The economic relations so established are essentially distributive: through 
various categories of exchanges of both products and labor, temporary imbalances 
such as those occasioned by insufficient labor power of a newly-established 
family unit or a catastrophic loss, which places one unit at an unfair reproductive 
disadvantage in relation to its allies, are evened out.” 32  
 
Family, of course, being defined by Patrilineal relations and distinguished from the 
previous household by a formal request to build a new family farm. This primitive 
government would also elect a village leader called a “starosta” and a tax collector. As 
Howe, argues in their book The Peasant Mode of Production, the obshchina developed as 
a means of practicality to ensure the equitable distribution of land and tax burden in the 
harsh Asian steppe.  
These two systems are the foundations of different political ideologies, one a 
proto-democratic structure in line with the example of the “commons” described by so 
many economists and political scientists and the other an unabridged monarchy without 
constraints, acting as the representative of the nation to the world, and of G-d in the 
nation. The struggle between these ideas played out, Billington notes, again and again 
throughout Russian history.  
First during the reign of Catherine (the Great), Russia had been going through 
some democratic reformations since the times of troubles, a period of instability after the 
 
32 Howe, Jovan E. "The peasant mode of production." Publications of the Department of 




end of the line of Rurik the first monarch of the Kievan Rus. Peter (the Great) was 
vaunted to Tsardom and implemented westernizing reforms in the Russian court most 
importantly building the new capital of St. Petersburg, establishing the Russian navy, and 
emancipating the serfs owned by the Russian Orthodox Church. These reforms continued 
until Catherine, who saw the violence of the French revolution, cracked down specifically 
on the expansion of democratic reforms. She went so far as to repeal the specific 
provision passed by Tsar Peter and reinstated serfdom for those serfs previously owned 
by the Church. 33 Repeating this pattern, Tsar Alexander II (The Great Emancipator) 
ended the institution of serfdom universally. 34 Tsar Alexander III and Tsar Nicholas II, 
following Tsar Alexander II, engaged in nationalizing campaigns finalizing the 
suppression of separatist movements and purging Swedish and German cultural 
influences from Russian government and society. In the case of Tsar Nicholas II (The 
Bloody) regressive political reform went hand in hand with repression in the form of 
nationalist pogroms, waves of systemic violence against Russian and Eastern European 
Jews, and the Bloody Sunday massacre. Although Nicholas eventually gave into demands 
for reform and created the Duma, the Russian parliament, distinct from the previous 
Boyar duma which was an aristocratic advisory council to the tsar, their relationship was 
very poor. The Duma in 1906, one year after its seating, authored “An Address to the 
 
33 Billington, James H. The Icon and the Axe: an Interpretative History of Russian 
Culture. New York: Vintage Books, 1970. 
34 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Duma.” Encyclopædia Britannica. 





Throne” demanding universal suffrage and the expulsion of ministers in favor of those 
selected by the Duma.  
Domestically, the “birthmarks” of the Russian society before the Soviet Union, 
seem diametrically opposed to democratization, according to Seymour Lipset’s 
conception of “tendency towards democracy” which we will address later. Having a low 
literacy rate, a closed social hierarchy, low GNP per capita, and voluntary community 
participation hampered by geography and climate. With the exception of the institution of 
the obshchina that seems to be prima facia democratic and communitarian with regard to 
the rights of the individual and the needs of the community. Regardless they did 
democratize but that democratic expansion has historically crashed against elite 
institutions and groups without the resolution the democratic expansions of England and 

















CHAPTER FOUR: PREVIOUS THEORETICAL MODELS OF 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
There are existing theories of democratization that posit alternatives, realistic or 
otherwise, about how a nation should encourage democratization and what the role of a 
third party, in our case the U.S., should be. As I mentioned previously, the two, we’ll 
contend with are Samuel Huntington’s “Waves of Democracy” thesis and Francis 
Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis. However, I’ll first define democratization in order 
to center a definition in our minds and to better understand what a democratic transition 
should look like in summation. For our purposes we’ll use Enrique Baloyra’s definition: 
“a process of political change initiated by the deterioration of an authoritarian 
regime involving intense political context among actors competing to implement 
policies grounded on different; even mutually exclusive, conceptions of the 
government, regime, and the state; this conflict is resolved by the breakdown of 
that regime leading to the installation of a government committed to the 
inauguration of a democratic regime and/or the installation of a popularly elected 
government committed to the inauguration of a democratic regime.” 35  
 
This definition has some necessary and sufficient conditions including: the deterioration 
of an authoritarian regime, internal political conflict over conceptions of government, and 
the ushering in of a democratic regime or a popular government committed to 
establishing a democratic regime. As we’ll see however, Fukuyama and Huntington’s 
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theories of this process don’t really contend with this definition or address the role states 
should play in it. Their theories are far more concerned with historical progression and 
the perceived ties between democratic and economic reform. 
Francis Fukuyama characterized the fall of the Soviet Union and its historical 
moment as the “total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western Liberalism.” 
36 In other words Fukuyama says that democracy is “the only game in town” Fukuyama 
makes two claims for his theory of democratization: 1) As stated above, there are no 
alternatives (not in any major population group or nation anyway) and 2) These 
alternative systems have not re-sprouted because their ideas have been so thoroughly 
rebutted. 37 38 39 This is of course a modern example of what scholars of democratization 
call modernization theory. The idea that the positive outcomes of economic expansion 
and success are tied, and coterminous, with democratic ones is seen as a means for 
promoting democratization. Additionally, states making serious attempts at democratic 
transitions are still precarious if they fail, coincidentally, to achieve some economic 
success, thus a successful, assumed capitalist, economy is a necessity for sustainable 
democratic change. This method of democratization is justified a little differently in 
Samuel Huntington’s The Third Wave: Democratization in the 20th Century; who argues 
states have little to no effect or reason to drive a particular model of democratization 
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because, in this case, there is a historical progression taking place that has produced 
democracies in very unlikely places.  
In a very short summary, Huntington analyzes the proliferation of democratic 
regimes from 1922 to about the 1990s and notices drastic fluctuations in the number of 
democracies. He determines there must be “waves” of democratization as opposed to the 
slow and steady march of democracy. Huntington argues that there are four potential 
explanations for these waves; 1) Single Cause, 2) Parallel Development, 3) Snowballing, 
and 4) Prevailing Nostrum. These explanations may explain particular waves of 
democratization; e.g. the third wave of democratization (from 1974 - undetermined) was 
provoked by the single cause of the oil shock-based economic collapse of the 1970s. 
Huntington’s theory describes both democratization and what he calls “reverse waves” 
which are historical patterns that explain failed democratization; waves of democratic 
expansion follow contractions. Contractions, not only, in the number of states who are 
democratic; but, how “democratic” these states really are in comparison to past 
democratic states and administrations.  
The common theme of Huntington, and Fukuyama’s works, are that 
democratization is a natural phenomenon; simply the way of the world. For these 
theories, democracy is a particular phenomenon, with backstops and eddies, but the best 
possible response is to allow for its development and promote other policy priorities that 
can be guaranteed. For Fukuyama, those other policy priorities can be, and are, 






this expansion and contraction pattern but the states who have adopted democracy, he  
admits, don’t seem to fit any sort of empirical pattern that could influence policy 
positions besides exclaiming your support for democracy. 
  Cynthia Alkon, in analyzing legal reform in post-communist states, writes about 
the tendency of the programs she studied to fall into “cookie cutter syndrome.” 40 This is 
the way in which western reformers treat nations as dough the “Western Liberal” cookie 
shape is pushed on to. If the cookie shape is followed, the rule of law, democratization, 
and reform will inevitably follow. For Fukuyama, that “cookie shape” is this updated 
modernization theory; where positive output A is directly correlated, and causative, with 
positive output B. States should pursue the proliferation of free market economics and the 
British legal tradition because democratization goes directly in hand with these other 
positive outputs. 41 The direct inputs in the form of expansion of legal traditions and 
capitalist economic policies, which can be directly controlled and implemented, lead to 
the positive outputs of the establishment and maintenance of these capitalist institutions 
and “democracy” which is so often measured by economic freedom, like in the CATO 
Institute’s Human Freedom Index. For Huntington, there are historic factors at play that 
have birthed democracy in the most unlikely of places regardless of the perceived 
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receptiveness of international and domestic actors to democracy. There is simply nothing 
to do but further analyze the waves of democratic transitions and either expand the theory  
into an explanatory position or wait for the next democratic wave after the current 
democratic crunch.42 43 Huntington’s theory clearly does not drive U.S. democratization 
nor is it particularly useful for understanding democratization as a process promoted by 
great powers. China, Iran, and Singapore clearly disagree about the viability of 
alternatives to western liberal democracy and they do not support democratization in any 
meaningful sense of the word. 44 Huntington’s work is self admittedly weak theoretically; 
succeeding only in analyzing specific historical moments, and even then it is unable to 
explain some specific democratic transitions or backslides. 45 For all of these reasons, we 
will build a theory of democratization complementary to Baloyra’s definition that will 
analyze democracies not natural phenomena but as process to be driven as the U.S. has 
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CHAPTER FIVE: A NEW THEORETICAL MODEL OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
In 1959, Seymour Lipset published one of the most cited papers in the history of 
the American Political Science Review titled Some Requisites for Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy. 46 In this piece, which was revisited by the author 
in later years but remained largely unchanged in its theory, Lipset lays out what he 
considers some necessary factors for democracy and outlines the effect each factor will 
have on civil society. He closes his piece with this helpful diagram (Table 1). 
47 
This model serves as the basis of my own. In his 1993 speech, Lipset revisited the 
dearth of responsibility that he laid, in his original article, on economic factors in 
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democratization. 48 This was because Huntington’s Third Wave had gained prominence 
and the historical record no longer supported democracy as an exclusively Western 
phenomenon with the decolonization of Africa, the Middle East, and South-East Asia 
whose new states largely became democracies despite their poor economic fortunes. 49 
With poor states, like Namibia and Lesotho becoming, and maintaining their democratic 
status, wealthy, relative to their neighbors, capitalist states like Brazil slipping out of 
democracy status. 50 51 The scholars who tend to challenge the view that affluence and a 
market economy are conditions of democratization have, in my judgment, the more 
persuasive arguments. In his article, analyzing the relationship between economic success 
and democratic political regimes, Adam Przeworski concludes, “In the end, there is not a 
single reason to sacrifice democracy at the altar of development.” 52 Secondly, I have cut 
the “additional consequences” portion of Lipset’s diagram in my own model simply 
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because it isn’t particularly useful for my project. This paper is not an attempt to describe 
the consequences of the implementation of a democratic regime but solely the ways in 
which states attempt to do so externally. However, I do not have any reason to disagree 
with, or discount, what Lipset identifies as additional consequences. 
Lipset is primarily concerned with the domestic factors that influence and help 
democratic actors build democratic regimes, and the institutions they rely upon. As such, 
before discussing the ways in which a foreign power can lean on internal forces in 
support of democratic reform, we should discuss the extant internal forces in support of, 
and against, democratic reform in Russia. Lipset points to an open class system as having 
a positive effect on democratic reform.  Of course, for much of Russia’s history their 
class system with stringent delineations between the boyars (aristocratic class), 
merchants, and the peasant or serf class. After industrialization a certain percentage of the 
Russian populous moved to the industrial centers of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and 
Novgorod forming an industrial working class parallel to the rural serf class. Today, this 
stringent class system has been shifted with oligarchs taking the role of the landed 
aristocracy and the average Russian citizen certainly doing far better than their serf 
compatriots but still marked as a lower class of Russian. 53 
Lipset also points to a nation’s economic resources and the social safety net it can 
support as useful for democratization. According to Paul Kennedy, Russia’s gross 
national product (GNP) was relatively high through the 1800s but fell behind Germany, 
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France, and Britain as they underwent industrialization. 54 Additionally, in Christopher 
Clark’s Sleepwalkers, he remarks on the value of the French state’s lending policies to 
Russia.55 Clark argues that much of Russia’s foreign policy in Eastern Europe at the time 
was dependent on free-flowing French state-backed loans. Today, Russian GDP lags 
behind most of the rest of the industrial world and is more in line with Middle Eastern 
states whose economic activity is almost exclusively based on oil production. 56 
According to Lipset, the expansion of democratic reforms, key among them 
voting, is dependent on the ability of the populous to read, understand, and respond to a 
ballot because the orchestration of thousands or hundreds of thousands of in-person votes 
is nigh on impossible. Russia’s literacy rate in the early 1900s was relatively low until the 
Likbez literacy program implemented shortly after the 1917 revolution. 57 In the 1990s 
and today, Russia’s literacy rate is on par with the rest of the industrialized world at 
around 99%. 58 
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Later well discuss the implementation of democratic reforms in Russia and the 
key prevalence of elections and the working model of democratization, described within 
the text of the U.S. policy, that places elections as they key to democratic reforms. I want 
to stress that elections do not a democracy make. John Dewey delineates the multitude of 
systems and requirements that make an actual democracy a democracy. 59 Universal 
suffrage, an independent judiciary, the ability to choose between competing conceptions 
of governance, etc. As we’ll see the U.S. democracy programs implemented in Russia did 
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CHAPTER SIX: DIAMOND AND EISEN’S CONTRIBTUIONS TO A 
THEORETICAL MODEL OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
Lipset’s work, and diagram, outlines the internal mechanisms that help establish 
and maintain democracy. Larry Diamond, in The Spirit of Democracy, argues for the 
necessity of some international mechanisms for building and establishing democracy. 
Likewise, in November 2019, Norman Eisen et. Al. and the Brookings Institute produced 
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding with their 
own set of prescribed actions for nations and other international actors who are looking to 
establish and promote democracy. Diamond and Eisen agree on some of these prescribed 
actions and they diverge sharply on another. Diamond and Eisen agree on the efficacy of 
applying peaceful pressure with sufficient linkages and leverage; supporting democratic 
actors both nationally and internationally; granting institutional access when appropriate 
to create a normative standard; and rewarding democratization with conditional funding. 
Their disagreement on the use of force is telling and will be discussed later but 
Diamond’s lens of analysis, studying democratic transitions the world over, led to a 
particular perspective on the use of force using key successful cases in Germany and 
Japan and key unsuccessful ones like Haiti. Eisen and his colleague’s view omits the use 
of force specifically because their area of interpretation is solely based on Eastern Europe 




Additionally, Eisen et. Al have no perspective on liberation technology which 
Diamond talks about, again I think this is due to their geographic perspective with most 
of Eastern Europe having a level of technological integration that parts of the Middle 
East, South East Asia, and Africa simply don’t. I have combined their theoretical models 
and prescribed actions to develop the following diagram. (Table 2) 
 
According to Diamond and Eisen, states that are seeking to support and build 
democracies abroad should understand and engage in pressure, provide support for 
democratic actors, and leverage conditional funding. Diamond, exclusively, argues for 
the national support of liberation technology; and Eisen et. Al. propose the extension of 
institutional access. Only on the matter of “force” do Diamond and Eisen potentially 





I should be clear that the external mechanisms, as I define them, are the tools available to 
third-party states to further a democratization process. States can and have democratized 
without external support in these aforementioned forms. 
 First, there is a distinction in this literature between pressure and force. Here 
pressure excludes all non-covert or overt militarized actions in defense of a democratic 
regime; or, in the overthrow of a non-democratic regime. 60 Eisen and his colleagues hold 
that there is a value to all kinds and intensities of pressure, depending on the 
circumstances, but they don’t speak to the use of force in terms of democracy production. 
This might be, as I said, because their case study and rules are highly focused on Europe 
today but nevertheless, they don’t comment. Diamond, in contrast, talks about the 
concept of “democratization by force” as a last resort open to states. 61 The oft repeated 
lessons of Germany and Japan post-WWII, Diamond says, offer very little as narratives 
counter to U.S. democratization efforts in Grenada, Haiti, and Iraq. What was the 
difference? Two things; Diamond says that the total destruction of Germany and Japan 
and the overwhelming international support, in the Western World, for the U.S. 's 
rebuilding mission make Germany and Japan fundamentally different from the other 
three cases. 62 Without saying anything about efficiency or efficacy, we can say there is 
some historic basis for the validity of force as a last-ditch effort to build democracy. 
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 Differentiating between pressure and force, Diamond and Eisen agree on the 
efficacy of pressure. As I said, pressure is all actions including covert or overt military 
action. Measures could extend from President Carter’s “name &shame” campaign 
through a wide range of economic incentives and sanctions to outright invasion and 
occupation. Diamond stresses that “leverage” and “linkage”, two terms from Stephen 
Levitsky and Lucan Way, affect the efficacy of pressure. 63 “Leverage” is the power to 
affect the economic and material conditions of a given authoritarian country’s 
constituencies as well as the power the authoritarian countries leverage against the 
democratizing power’s constituencies. 64 For example, the reliance of western nations on 
Middle Eastern oil supplies severely diminishes western powers’ relative “leverage”. 65   
Linkages are the material, political, or social connections between either 1) an 
authoritarian state and groups within the state or external actors promoting 
democratization or 2) a coalition of democratizing states. The stronger a connection 
between an authoritarian state and democratizing states the stronger the effects of 
peaceful pressure. Secondly, the stronger the ties between a coalition of democratizing 
states the less chance of defection within that coalition and thus the greater collective 
effect of democratizing states. It is also important that states signal their leverage and 
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their resolve. In The Democracy Playbook, Eisen argues the U.S. and other western 
powers should signal clearly that they will react robustly to democratic rollbacks, human 
rights abuses, censoring of the media, restricting the autonomy of universities, or 
hampering judicial independence. 66 Eisen argues that having leverage is insufficient 
unless a state is willing to state it outright, outline the steps which will be rewarded and 
those that will be punished and is actually committed to substantial rewards and severe 
punishments as appropriate. With sufficient “linkages” and “leverage” Diamond and 
Eisen agree, without condition, that states who seek to spread democracy could, and 
should, do so through peaceful pressure.  
Next, Eisen and Brookings, stress several prescribed actions that I’ve lumped into 
support for national and international democratic actors. These can be actors within civil 
society, independent investigative media, and domestic and international non-
governmental institutions (NGOs). 67 Diamond also stresses the need of supporting actors 
like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). 68 Actors within civil society, like 
bureaucrats and politicians, can be supported in creating and adopting any number of 
liberalizing rules. For example, the European Union (EU) has a series of pre-ascension 
rules designed to strengthen democracy and the rule of law by forcing civil society 
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members, and ultimately states, to agree to, implement, and learn about any number of 
structures and rules that are fundamentally pro-democracy. Independent media, especially 
media located outside of the physical capital, can educate the population, carry narratives 
that are pro-democracy, and expose the fallibility of the ruling regime which, according 
to Lipset, is so incredibly dependent on external sources of legitimacy when it does not 
yet possess the legitimacy provided through the consent of the governed. 69 70 Some 
domestic and international NGOs support democracy and democratic actors. Doing so 
while distributing necessary material needs can increase the linkage between 
democratizing states and the constituents of the authoritarian state. Eisen is especially 
concerned with promoting positive relations between NGOs and the central government 
to counter the narrative that these two should always be diametrically opposed. 71 In 
addition, Diamond encourages domestic support for state-operated democratization 
efforts within democratizing states. Actors like the NED, Diamond notes, are unique and 
flexible in supporting democratizing efforts. The NED, being made up of the National 
Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the Center for International 
Enterprise, and the Solidarity Center, covers the largest U.S. domestic coalitions and can 
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act in a variety of ways in support of democracy. 72 Again, Diamond and Eisen agree 
support for domestic and international actors, both in democratizing states and in 
authoritarian states, are key for supporting democratization efforts.  
Acknowledging the limitations of sanctions and funding to drive behavior, 
Diamond and Eisen both agree on tying conditional funding to democratization. Whether 
you agree with Lipset, writing in 1956,  that economic success is a key factor in 
democratizing in the first place or you think that there is some level of coincidence 
between the relative economic success and the success of democracy in the U.S. and 
Western Europe, there seems to be an overwhelming level of economic success amongst 
states who support democracy abroad. 73 Diamond and Eisen argue that states with 
financial power can use this leverage to shape and shove authoritarian states behavior 
towards democracy. This ability is amplified when states act in concert like the 
conditional extension of funding offered by the EU to states like Poland. Conditional 
funding creates a normative standard of behavior among these authoritarian states 
reinforcing democratization simply through their own bureaucratic habit, while also 
potentially reinforcing democracy through the funding of institutions listed above. The 
key to this mechanism is its conditionality. In recent years, Poland and Hungary have 
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strained at the bonds of European society. 74 75 So far, the EU has not rescinded their 
funding or status as full member states but instead has farmed the issue out to the 
European Commission, with every passing day EU funding supports a new pattern of 
increasingly illiberal behavior violating the presumed notion of conditionality.  
Next, in the way that conditional funding creates an enforcement mechanism for 
behavior through habit, institutional access enforces behavior through normative ideals 
and standards. Eisen and Brookings specifically talk about access to institutions like the 
European Court of Human Rights. Institutions like the court and others monitor and 
produce reports on member states behavior. 76 While the Court of Human Rights and the 
Council of Europe, contain states we can unequivocally call authoritarian they still, 
produce reports that have two effects on normative standards. A poor report may hamper 
a state’s influence within those organizations which the authoritarian state would find it 
necessary to maintain not only to shield itself from blowback but to link itself to other 
states to hamper a coalition forming against them. These institutions could also produce 
reporting that creates a negative reputation. For states concerned with domestic and 
international legitimacy, as well as normative ideas about themselves being constantly 
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subjected to reputational decline and institutional criticism may, in the long term, affect 
their willingness to change incrementally. 77 Especially when those changes are rewarded 
with further institutional access and conditional funding.  
Finally, there is one last lesson to be learned from two media organizations: Al-
Jazeera and Al-Arabiyah. These two organizations disseminate some of the best on the 
ground news for the Middle East and do so in English, Arabic, and other languages to an 
international audience. They also allow “ ordinary Arabs [to] call in and voice their 
unedited grievances live before 20 million viewers”. 78 While there has been a recent turn 
in our opinions towards technology as a means of community organizing and general 
good, Diamond argues there is sufficient evidence that on the whole it will turn out 
positively. Between mobile communication, free video uploading, anonymity, ease of 
access to liberation technology like cell phones and computers can, and have, helped 
millions of online communities form around niche interests. In authoritarian countries 
one of these communities can be those who are unhappy with the current regime and are 
willing to work together to make their collective voices heard. Diamond stresses that 
authoritarian states are very good, and getting better, at shutting down access to these 
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platforms and this technology. 79 The last thing a state supporting democracy should do is 
join them and must instead demonstrate a vibrant democracy with access to technology 
and the freedom to criticize the government at home if they want to support democracy 
abroad. 80  
These issues and actions are highly interconnected. Their scope is not always 
agreed upon and in the case of force there may be an outright disagreement. However, 
scholars of democratization agree that there is a place for states to support democracy 
abroad. While there are a multitude of ways one can work to support democracy abroad, 
there some key actions that states and locations of states should do: apply peaceful 
pressure with sufficient linkages and leverage; support democratic actors both nationally 
and internationally; grant institutional access when appropriate to create a normative 
standard; reward democratization with conditional funding; support the use and 
dissemination of liberation technology; and if all else fails make the decision to support 
democratization through force from the very ashes up or not at all because half measures, 
as Diamond argues about the failed democratization efforts the U.S. underwent in Haiti 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: A HISTORY OF U.S. DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS IN 
RUSSIA FROM 1989 TO 2004 
 The U.S. has a long and prolific foreign policy history in accordance with its 
status as a rising, dominant, and eventually global power from the late 1790s onwards to 
today. In 1991, the U.S. shifted its foreign policy concerns from the containment of 
Soviet power to the possible consequences of the dissolution of the Soviet State.  The 
extraordinary shift in concerns inevitably had programmatic consequences.  One 
consequence was a set of programs designed to provide economic aid and assistance 
including the provision of food, water, and medical care, carte blanche. A second set of 
policy actions took the form of direct support and funding to democratization programs 
akin to the ones we have been discussing. A third set of policies and actions don’t seem 
directly akin to democratization but had an outsized effect on the process of Russian 
political development in the 1990s. These latter two sets are our focus and I will in short 
order explain the history behind and effects, both direct and indirect, of these actions.  I 
begin with the explicit democratization programs: the NED, the SEED act, and the 
FREEDOM support act of 1992. Then I will discuss the policy decisions made by the 
U.S. that, while being outside of the direct realm of democratization, had a significant 
impact on Russian development namely Shock Therapy Economics and the events of the 




 In 1982, President Ronald Reagan, in a speech to the British parliament, proposed 
a joint government program between the U.S. and their Western European allies that 
would be explicitly aimed at promoting democracy abroad. 82 This program when 
eventually created by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1983 was the National 
Endowment for Democracy (or NED). 83 The NED became a non-governmental 501C-3 
centered in Washington D.C. with four constituent offices that account for half of its 
budget, with the other half being awarded in grants to other programs abroad. These 
offices are the American Center for Labor Solidarity (ACILS), the Center for 
International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs (NDI), and International Republican Institute (IRI). Throughout the 
1980s until the Obama administration, who briefly moved the funding into a separate 
umbrella within the Stater Department, the NED was the main funding mechanism for 
international democratization programs around the world. 84  
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The NED receives funding annually from Congress and the Democracy Fund, as 
an outlay of the State department budget. 85 
The Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) act was a bundle of 
legislation originally directed at Poland and Hungary but eventually expanded to the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia, Albania, and other former socialist states. 86 This 
legislation provided funding and education materials on agriculture, trade, investment, 
and cultural and scientific expansion. This funding and material were based on a few 
prerequisites including the removal of trade restrictions and the export of profits from 
these countries to U.S. based foreign investors. These programs would, after their 
establishment, support and fund burgeoning democratic institutions within their field. 
Today, it must be remarked, the SEED act has had little to no affect at achieving market 
or quality of life parity between Western Europe and much of the former socialist 
republics with Hungary and Poland having some marked success but with significant help 
from the European Union. 87 
The Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets 
Support Act of 1992 or simply the FREEDOM Support Act was a democratization 
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program not fundamentally different from the one inscribed in the SEED act. The 
FREEDOM Support act fostered democracy and viable political institutions through the 
creation of American Business Centers (ABCs) that would operate in the developing 
markets in Eastern Europe but most important provide for jobs in the U.S. by directing 
U.S. business interests to invest in Eastern European resource markets. 88 Split between 
the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, these ABCs would represent 
the U.S.’s economic interests abroad, support drug eradication programs, and make 
progress toward the implementation of democratic institutions and governance in these 
countries. Critically, while the SEED act was targeted at specific states who were 
arguably more western and more democratic the FREEDOM support act allowed the 
President to place ABCs where he deemed they would be efficient and profitable and 
could draw on the SEED fund to establish them.  
 The FREEDOM support act, the SEED act, and the NED act and its subsequent 
institution, the National Endowment for Democracy, represented the body of direct U.S. 
democratization efforts in Russia from 1989 to 2004; and until the Obama Administration 
rerouted the funding of some of these programs through the U.S. democracy fund in his  
first term. 89 
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Although, this funding shift was reversed under the Trump Administration. 90 They do 
not however, represent the end of the U.S.’s actions to spread democracy to Russia by all 
means. The process of shock therapy economics, as well see directly, also was conceived 
as an instrument of democratization. Also, the results and processes of the Russian 
Presidential election and the influence of the Clinton administration had an outsized 
effect on Russia’s democratic development, had an outsized impact on a Russian 
conception of democratization. 
 The concept of shock therapy economics has been attributed to Milton Freidman 
directly and to economist and professor Jeffrey Sachs who admittedly hated the term and 
denied his specific use thereof. Regardless of its origin, shock therapy economics is the 
process of removing price and currency controls, liberalizing trade practices, eliminating 
state subsidies, and the large-scale privatization of formerly state-owned assets and doing 
all of these things as close to instantaneously as possible. In theory, these planned shocks 
would jump-start a nation’s economy, it was believed and argued, by releasing latent 
entrepreneurial energy hitherto repressed by the state-run economy with its vast 
regulatory structure and hostility to most or all forms of private enterprise.  Critics say 
this shock creates an unnecessary and dramatic rise in inequality and unemployment 
where gradualism can address stagnation without these severe jumps. Regardless, Yegor 
Gaidar, with the advice of the Washington consensus and economic advisor Jeffrey 
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Sachs, instituted these shock therapy economic reforms during his time as prime minister 
from June 1992 to December 1992.  
The GINI coefficient rose around 9 points, Russia’s GDP contracted by 18% from 
1990 to 1998, and the rates of suicide and alcoholism exploded in step with 
unemployment and inflation during the same period. Joseph Stiglitz argues that the 
implementation of these reforms during a moment of political crisis without a strong 
government and institutionalized law created a race to the bottom “strip Russia for 
capital” mentality where competition meant if newly private owners didn’t strip their 
factories and physical capital someone else would forcibly take it from them and sell it 
off later. 91  This mentality combined with the systemic under evaluation of state-owned 
enterprises led to a collection of oligarchs today controlling entire industries in Russia.  
 There is no question as to the failure of the Russian shock therapy program; but, 
why does Jeffrey Sachs argue it was necessary in the first place? In What I did in Russia, 
he answers this very question. 92 Sachs first reminds us that he has helped implement 
reform programs like this in Bolivia, in Russia, and in Poland. Sachs argues each of these 
states faced the same problems: a failing government, a currency inflating into the 
hundreds and thousands of percentage points, and productive stagnation. Sachs viewed 
his role as fundamentally short term and advisory.  
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In Poland, the shock therapy reforms were far less destructive and depending on 
your analysis prepared Poland for its economic success today. Why didn’t this happen in 
Russia? While Sachs agrees the problems facing Poland and Russia were the same, the 
scale of these problems was not. While Poland required about $1 billion U.S. in direct 
stabilizing funds Russia, says Sachs, would require around $5 billion U.S. in funds and 
$15 billion U.S. in direct economic aid. Ultimately, Sachs argues the inability of the U.S. 
and the international order to meet these funding levels and implement these reforms as 
stringently as Bolivia and Poland did ultimately led to their failure. I think Sach’s 
analysis requires some comparison though. In the 1960s and 1970s before implementing 
the Deng reforms, China faced the same economic stagnation and monetary inflation. 
President Deng Xiao-Ping and his predecessors engaged in a series of incremental 
economic reforms that brought China’s GDP from 2.7% growth in the 1960s to 15.7% 
growth in 2005. 93 Incrementalism produced a strong private sector, massive GDP 
growth, and a GDP rivaling the U.S., although it coincided with the Chinese Communist 
Party’s authoritarian hold on political power. In the midst of this crisis in Russia the 
Presidential Elections, the first since the fall of the Soviet Union were held; and, left 
something to be desired. 
The results of the 1996 Russian election are relatively uncontentious in both the 
Russian and American academies. American scholars and foreign policy officials confirm 
that the Clinton administration offered funding, technical support, 
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and advisors to Boris Yeltsin’s presidential campaign and helped Yeltsin achieve a slight 
win against the latent Russian Communist Party in the first round and a 10 pt. or so lead 
in the second. 94 The official Kremlin position on the outcome of the 1996 election is the 
same. However, multiple opposition candidates, in a meeting with Dmitri Medvedev, 
current prime minister and former president of Russia, argued that Medvedev was 
adamant “Yeltsin had lost”. 95 Regardless, this event as the first real exercise of 
democratic action in Russia on the federal executive level was marred by contention. 
Unusual shifts in voting patterns in some of the more ethnically diverse Russian oblasts, 
huge donations, the promised orchestration of a IMF bailout, the movement of President 
Yeltsin from 8% in polling to winning with 54% of the vote coincide with a domestic 
pattern of distrust in democratic outcomes and one of the least popular Russian leaders in 
history. 96 
 These programs define the bulk of U.S. democratization efforts in Russia and 
unfortunately, as we’ll see, they act counter to any academic model of democratization. 
They also reveal a fundamental premise of American democratization: in the American 
foreign policy apparatus, the promotion of laissez-faire capitalism and democracy are 
deemed synonymous. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: COMPARING THE HISTORICAL RECORD TO THE 
THEORETICAL MODEL AND CRITIQUE 
 A basic academic conception of a democratization model would advise a state 
interested in spreading democracy abroad to invest in tools to apply pressure, provide 
support for national and international democratic actors, be willing to apply force in some 
instances, provide conditions for institutional access and developmental assistance, and 
invest in the creation and distribution of  liberation technology, whatever that means in 
each historical context. The actions of the U.S. directly, or seemingly indirectly, in the 
aid of democratization in Russia from 1989 to 2004 reflect a botched democratization 
model that assumes that democratization is synonymous with the expansion of neo-liberal 
capitalism and this is empirically present in the text and provisions of the legislative 
actions and diplomatic actions that the U.S. undertook from 1989 until 2004 where the 
U.S.-Russian relationship degraded beyond direct U.S. influence. It presumes, in the 
model of Fukuyama’s conception of modernization theory, that the expansion of 
capitalism as a positive outcome is hand in hand with other perceived positive outcomes 
such as democratization.  This model is, and at the time was, directly contradictory to any 
sense of Russian path dependency which would not allow them to be sublimated into a 





These policies and institutions include, as previously mentioned, the NED, the SEED act, 
the FREEDOM support act, Shock Therapy economics, and the Clinton Administration’s 
response to the 1996 Russian presidential election on behalf of former President Yeltsin.  
 The NED and its institutions are the only attempt, on our list, that seem to actively 
fulfill some of the model of democratization we developed. Their funding expanded 
support to democratic actors in Russia including youth activists, pollsters, election 
monitors, and judicial opinion shops on campaign finance and election law. 97 They built 
linkages and structures throughout Eastern Europe, most importantly including Russia, to 
encourage the democratization of the entire swath of former socialist states.   
Today Russia and several other Eastern European countries and other more 
“authoritarian” states decry the NED and their programs as western expansionism and 
invasive. I think however, broadly, that the NED is a legitimate attempt to support 
democratic actors, expand labor rights, drive judicial reform towards impartial juridical 
systems that are not inherently or necessarily based on the British legal tradition, and a 
Liberal conception of civil liberties. Although, the NED, even as the most in line with a 
model of democratization, is more logically sound and researched based, it has a specific 
drive through the Center for International Private Enterprise to whose stated mission is, 
“strengthening democracy around the globe through private enterprise and market-
oriented reform” marking democratic reform and economic reform as at least dual 
 





projects. 98 The NED’s stand-alone position in actually supporting democratizing 
programs and their position alongside other “democratizing” programs weakens their 
ability to actually provide the support they intend to. 
 The SEED act explicitly excluded Russia and was aimed at extending capitalism 
to former socialist states. Despite their mandate to promote democracy and the fostering 
of democratic institutions the SEED act offered no way or funding to do so. Instead, 
funding was directed at trade and investment, agricultural expansion, and private sector 
development. Specifically, the SEED act provides for,  
“(1) URGENT ACTION TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY- The scheduling of 
democratic elections throughout Eastern Europe creates circumstances requiring a 
prompt and skillful response, using immediately available resources, from U.S. 
Government-funded agencies engaged in assisting in the development abroad of 
democratic practice and institutions.” 99 
 
as its first provision; followed by a slew of market reforms in in technical training, credit 
union support, international trade, most favorable trade status, tax relationships, 
restructuring of international debt, tourist and student exchanges, and ensuring access to 
markets for American corporations. That funding was of course not predicated on 
manifest efforts to build the institutional architecture of democracy nor was it predicated 
on empirical signs of democratic governance or democratic institution building. Instead, 
funding was based on the willingness to liberalize trade relationships, allow for direct, 
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and indirect, foreign investment on the part of the U.S., and critically to allow the free 
flow of capital in and out of the target countries. The U.S. model of democratization in 
the case of the SEED act can be seen either as subordinating democratization to fostering 
capitalist expansion or as presuming that democracy would spring automatically from the 
conversion of a statist economy to one dominated by private actors.  It calls for the 
support of democratic institutions but funds economic institutions.  It presses for very 
early elections without consideration of the consequences of such elections for the 
establishment of a real democratic government. 
 The FREEDOM Support act of 1992 was equally clear in its  prescriptive 
messaging. Again, the text of the bill provides a direct mission to ensure the fostering of 
democratic institutions and democratic actors across Eastern Europe saying,  
“(1) recent developments in Russia and the other independent states of the 
   former Soviet Union present an historic opportunity for a transition to 
a peaceful and stable international order and the integration of the 
independent states of the former Soviet Union into the community of 
democratic nations; 
(2) the entire international community has a vital interest in the success 
 of this transition . . .” 100 
 
This mission would be carried out by ABCs, acting on behalf of the U.S. Commerce 
Department to establish American business branches in Russia and Eastern Europe and 
provide for domestic American jobs, through local market investment. One could argue 
that these ABCs were an attempt to build linkages and apply pressure in Russia. 
However, the nature of the development of these ABCs, at the discretion of the American  
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President would not allow for sufficient linkages between ABCs and Russia to have any 
real effect on the Russian domestic environment. They didn’t hire local Russians, they’re 
actions in the resource markets of Russia were, throughout the 1990s, primarily market 
shorts, where investors buy market instruments that accrue value as the market – or 
segments thereof – collapse; making money off the failures of the Russian market, and 
they had no proven connections or mission to interact with domestic governments and 
non-governmental actors. Their perception, and perceived failure, to pursue the interests 
of anyone other than the American Business community was documented by Prof. A. V. 
Yurchernenko in his 2018 article. 101  He argues persuasively that the ABCs built in 
Russia rejected the advice of both Russian and U.S. economists and in some cases 
directly denied these economic researchers and advisors from studying the businesses 
themselves. Additionally, when these ABCs did make internal or external policy 
decisions they were in line with the economic theories and prescriptions of the U.S. 
Commerce Department. 102  
 The SEED act, the FREEDOM support act, and the program of shock therapy 
economics recommended by the Washington consensus are expressly economic programs 
shaped by a political agenda. Programs designed to expand a uniquely American neo-
liberal capitalism to Russia and the former soviet republics, because, in an American 
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Libertarian conception the market is synonymous with democracy. All these programs 
were commissioned with spreading democracy and supporting democratic actors and 
democratic institutions but were provided with the tools to spread American economic 
interests.  
Scholars argue that conditional funding can encourage democratization as the 
carrot to the stick of military force or institutional pressure, Eisen and the Brookings 
institute recommend doing so in Eastern Europe as we mentioned. A key source of  
contention in the Russian presidential election of 1996 was the rules and arrangement of a 
much-needed IMF bailout package for Russia. The election of President Yeltsin and his 
programs of further liberalization were key to the processing of favorable terms to the aid 
package finalized in 1998. Conditionality was applied but unfortunately on the back end. 
The aid was given with the promise that Yeltsin would “stay on the right path” and stay 
he did; overseeing the worst economic decade in the Russian collective memory. 103 That 
funding has continued despite democratic backsliding through the 2000s, thus making a 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
 First, I have a general critique that I would be remiss if I didn’t air it. Any model 
of democratization, including Diamond’s, Eisen’s, my own, Fukuyama’s, or Baloyra’s 
puts a preeminence on democratization over a conception of state sovereignty. This 
theoretical preference justifies a very real power disparity when the U.S. is supporting the 
democratizing project because very few states have the real ability to resist the U.S.’s 
imposed international order. Taking as a given that democracy and its expansion even in 
its worst form spreading around the world is laudable; I think any conception of 
democratization that places it above a conception of state sovereignty and the right to rule 
as the sovereign, legitimate or otherwise, sees fit is a dangerous misunderstanding of the 
system of real politic that states operate under. In his book, Russia Against the Rest 
Richard Sakwa argues that Russia, meaning the military and political personnel involved 
in negotiations and commenting on political affairs, fundamentally sees itself as global 
power deserving an equal say in international affairs and the U.S. theorized and acted in 
direct disregard for any sense of Russian sovereignty. As Sakwa puts it so well, Russian 
policy officials, intelligence officials,  and military personnel envisioned joining the 
international order as equals and voiced that view vociferously; the U.S. was intent on 
sublimating Russia into a western world order as a new middling power sitting just below 




democratization the U.S. used to drive its policy action it would not give due deference to 
Russian sovereignty and its political path and would be doomed to failure at the hands of 
Russian statesmen concerned with piloting their own political destiny; chafing at the 
international order. 
 Secondly, to our original question; I think the strongest critique I can make is that 
the U.S. clearly was overly focused on economic reform, to the de facto detriment of 
democratic reform in Russia. The direct policy and program implementation the U.S. 
underwent during this period directly conflated the expansion of capitalism with the 
expansion of democracy in the way that scholars like Fukuyama theorized. Programs like 
the SEED and FREEDOM support acts, within their written text, conflated democracy 
with market reforms and almost single-mindedly directed the bureaucratic power of the 
executive and the funding power of congress directly to programs and institutions whose 
stated goals were liberalizing trade agreements, enticing American investors, and 
ensuring the free flow of capital to, and more importantly, from Russia and the former 
Soviet Bloc. To the degree that politicians and foreign policy bureaucrats were aware of 
modernization theory and the other works we have mentioned; revealed preferences 
indicate that economic reform was certainly primary amongst their concerns. 
Going forward, any serious and scholarly attempts at spreading democracy, as 
defined as a key goal of U.S. foreign policy, must be prepared to deal systemically and 
holistically with the political path and national sense of self developed in almost every 
country. In the landmark cases whereby, democracy was instituted abroad at the behest of 




socially, and economically and were rebuilt from the ground up. In the case of Russia, as 
I have said multiple times, Russia has a sense of national self; astride east and west, an 
international player in Europe, Asia, the Pacific, and the Arctic. Since the turn of the 20th 
century it envisioned playing a legitimate role in shaping the structures of the 
international system to its own benefit. When confronted with a changing reality in the 
1990s Russian political leaders commented to the point of expecting an equal seat at the 
table with deference given to their role as the successor state of one of two superpowers 
in the history of the world. 104 American diplomats dismissed these concerns and 
explained Russia’s contemporary role alongside Germany, France, Brazil, and India as 
bigger than average powers sublimated into the U.S. international order. 105  
Next, future democratization programs must, in the allocation of their mission and 
funding, divorce the expansion of democracy from the expansion of capitalism to work to 
provide funding for institutions and actors who actually support democracy abroad by 
building and applying pressure, tying funding and institutional access to democratic 
conditionality, and funding and distributing liberation technology in a time when 
surveillance capitalism in expanding rapidly inside and out of authoritarian countries 
more in line with the theoretical model we built. 106 Analysis of the subsequent decades 
and the specific democratization programs implemented in Iraq, Afghanistan, parts of  
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Africa, and elsewhere around world would be necessary to answer the question of the 
fundamental concerns of more modern democratization projects after this period 
stretching across the Clinton, Bush jr., and Obama Administrations. However, the 
American political path, in development since the time of the founding fathers, has 
placed the role of capitalism and trade at the forefront of the National mission. So much 
so that when concerned solely with the spread of democracy John Quincy Adams, as Sec. 
of State, warned his contemporaries, “America does not go abroad in search of monsters 
to destroy. She is the well-wisher to freedom and independence of all. She is the 
champion and vindicator only of her own” and to the role of economics George 
Washington said in a letter in Benjamin Harrison, “A people… who are possessed of the 
spirit of commerce, who see and who will pursue their advantages may achieve almost 
anything” and so I struggle to imagine a U.S. in which market-based economic reform 
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